China and the World since 1945: An International History (The Making of the Contemporary World)

China and the World since 1945: An International History (The Making of the Contemporary World)

Language: English

Pages: 160

ISBN: 0415606519

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub


The emergence of China as a dominant regional power with global influence is a significant phenomenon in the twenty-first century. Its origin could be traced back to 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong came to power and vowed to transform China and the world. After the ‘century of humiliation’, China was in constant search of a new identity on the world stage. From alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s, China normalized relations with America in the 1970s and embraced the global economy and the international community since the 1980s. This book examines China’s changing relations with the two superpowers, Asian neighbours, Third World countries, and European powers.

China and the World since 1945 offers an overview of China’s involvement in the Korean War, the Sino-Soviet split, Sino-American rapprochement, the end of the Cold War, and globalization. It assess the roles of security, ideology, and domestic politics in Chinese foreign policy and provides a synthesis of the latest archival-based research on China’s diplomatic history and Cold War international history

This engaging new study examines the rise of China from a long-term historical perspective and will be essential to students of Chinese history and contemporary international relations.

Empires Apart: A History of American and Russian Imperialism

The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union

The Communist Manifesto and Other Writings (Barnes & Noble Classics)

The Party Forever: Inside China's Modern Communist Elite

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

narrow principle of territorial sovereignty’ but should be seen as ‘part of the strategic arrangements for the general East–West struggle’. As the Cold War intensified in Asia, Hong Kong served as an outpost for gathering intelligence on the outside world, Sino-Soviet Alliance 23 a valuable port to obtain prohibited goods and capital, as well as a wedge to split the Anglo-American alliance. To the CCP leaders, Hong Kong was a problem ‘left behind by history’, and its resolution would be ‘a

consisting of the three Indochinese states as well as other friendly Asian countries. The US delegation to Geneva was instructed to assume an ambivalent yet uncompromising position, not playing an active role in the negotiation. (Its head, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, even refused to shake hands with Premier Zhou when they encountered each other at the conference by chance.) At Geneva, Zhou used his diplomatic skills to exploit the contradictions between America and its allies, France

instrumental use of the Five Principles by the Chinese leaders, some scholars may have suggested the answer. To Ronald Keith, Zhou and Mao conceived the strategy of peaceful coexistence in 42 Peaceful coexistence the context of an international united front to ally China with the Asian neutralist states and the pragmatic Western countries in the struggle against the main enemy, the United States.21 According to Chih-Yu Shih, the rhetoric of ‘peace’ was employed as a ‘shaming technique’. By

serious disagreements about which countries should be invited. China wanted to radicalize the Afro-Asian movement by excluding the Soviet Union from the conference. But India was anxious to prevent possible Chinese dominance of the conference and to channel the Asian-African countries to the Non-Aligned Movement, founded in 1961, of which it was a key member. Thus, India supported the invitation of the Soviet Union and of Malaysia, which was at odds with proBeijing Indonesia. The opinions were so

not to renew the 1950 SinoSoviet Treaty and proposing the holding of normalization talks. The talks at vice-ministerial level took place in November and ended without agreement. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, Beijing postponed the scheduled second-round meeting. Despite the lack of progress on political relations, bilateral trade and cultural contacts between China and the Soviet Union expanded. By 1982, as the strategic international balance of power was perceived to have

Download sample

Download

Comments are closed.