Lenin and His Comrades: The Bolsheviks Take Over Russia 1917-1924

Lenin and His Comrades: The Bolsheviks Take Over Russia 1917-1924

Yuri Felshtinsky

Language: English

Pages: 292

ISBN: 1929631952

Format: PDF / Kindle (mobi) / ePub

What was the real impact and significance of the October Revolution of 1917? This avowedly revisionist interpretation by a major Russian dissident seeks to place Lenin and those around him in the proper perspective. Since the takeover of Russia was the result of a coup d’état by a tiny minority of criminals that Yuri Felshtinsky doesn’t hesitate to call gangsters, the Communist regime was doomed from the start.

Yuri Felshtinsky received a PhD in history from Rutgers University. His books include The Failure of the World Revolution (1991), Blowing up Russia (with Alexander Litvinenko, 2007), and The Corporation: Russia and the KGB in the Age of President Putin (with Vladimir Pribylovsky, 2008). He lives near Boston, Massachusetts.

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Stalin again “and asked that it be delivered by hand [and] a reply obtained.” Thus, the letter that was dated March 5 was not sent until March 6. On the same day, Lenin dictated “a letter to the Mdivani group” (with copies to Trotsky and Kamenev), also directed against Stalin and constituting the last piece of officially acknowledged Leniniana: “I am following your case with all my heart. I am outraged by Ordzhonikidze’s rudeness and the connivance of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing notes

Yelistratov a few times, but we never exchanged a word. We merely looked at each other, that was all. I thought I detected in his eyes the same torment of a deeply hidden secret. I may be wrong, but it seemed to me that he was also the slave of a secret. What became of him, I don’t know—he soon disappeared from Gorki. Volkov fell silent, but a minute later he added: “Alas, I was never able to carry out Lenin’s request. I told no one about the note. You are the first. You can ask me why I have

Krasnaya kniga Cheka — Harvard University and Hoover Institution copy. Nicolaevsky’s collection at Hoover Institution (Stanford University), N. Valentinov-Volsky collection, box 4. L. Dan correspondence. Letter from L. Dan to N. Valentinov-Volsky, May 1, 1961, p. 2. Nicolaevsky’s collection at Hoover Institution, box 18, folder 1. Transcript of foreign policy report from the conference [of the Kadets in Yekaterinodar?], May 14, 1918, pp. 8–10. The author is not named. Nicolaevsky’s collection

21.    Nicolaevsky’s collection, box 392, folder 4. V. Zenzinov. Stranichka iz istorii rannego bol’shevizma. 22.    V. Voitinsky. Gody pobed i porazhenii, vol. 2. Berlin, 1924, p. 103. 23.    L. Martov. Spasiteli ili uprazdniteli? Paris, 1911, pp. 20–21. 24.    See S. Shesternin. Realizatsiya nasledstva posle N. P. Shimidta i moi vstrechi s Leninym. — in Staryi bol’shevik, vol. 5 (8). M., 1933, p. 153. 25.    Ibid, p. 155. 26.    U. Kamenev. Dve partii. L., 1924, p. 184; N.

Brest-Litovsk as a legitimate participant in the peace talks. It was the Central Committee’s point of view concerning this question that Trotsky knew so well: no concessions, refusal to recognize the “bourgeois” Rada in Kiev, and in the event of German persistence—an end to the peace talks. At this moment—so decisive for the fate of the Ukrainian Communist revolution—the Soviet government could not recognize the Ukrainian Rada even for the sake of a separate peace with Germany, even if Lenin

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